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The Causes of Preference Reversal 
By AMOS TVERSKY, PAUL SLOVIC, AND DANIEL KAHNEMAN* 
Observed preference reversal (PR) cannot be adequately explained by violations of 
independence, the reduction axiom, or transitivity. The primary cause of PR is the 
failure of procedure invariance, especially the overpricing of low-probability 
high-payoff bets. This result violates regret theory and generalized (nonindepen-
dent) utility models. PR and a new reversal involving time preferences are 
explained by scale compatibility, which implies that payoffs are weighted more 
heavily in pricing than in choice. (JEL 215) 
Axiomatic theories of choice introduce 
preference as a primitive relation, which is 
interpreted through specific empirical proce-
dures such as choice or pricing. Models of 
rational choice assume a principle of proce-
dure invariance, which requires strategically 
equivalent methods of elicitation to yield the 
same preference order. Thus, if the decision 
maker prefers A to B, then the cash equiva-
lent, or minimum selling price, of A should 
exceed that of B. However, there is a sub-
stantial body of evidence showing that the 
price ordering of risky prospects is systemat-
ically different from the choice ordering, 
contrary to standard theories of choice. 
The effect of elicitation method on prefer-
ence between gambles was first observed by 
Paul Slovic and Sarah Lichtenstein (1968) 
who found that both buying and selling 
prices of gambles were primarily determined 
by the payoffs, whereas choices between 
gambles (and ratings of their attractiveness) 
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were primarily influenced by the probabili-
ties of winning and losing. Slovic and Licht-
enstein reasoned that, if the method used to 
elicit preferences affected the weighting of 
the gambles' components, it should be possi-
ble to construct pairs of gambles such that 
the same individual would choose one mem-
ber of the pair but set a higher price for the 
other. Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971, 1973) 
demonstrated such reversals in a series of 
studies, one of which was conducted on the 
floor of the Four Queens Casino in Las 
Vegas with experienced gamblers playing for 
real money. 
The preference-reversal phenomenon in-
volves a pair of gambles of comparable ex-
pected value. One gamble (the H bet) offers 
a high probability of winning a modest sum 
of money; the other gamble (the L bet) 
offers a low probability of winning a rela-
tively large amount of money. These bets 
were also called the P bet and the $ bet, 
respectively. For example, 
H bet: 28 /36 chance to win $10 
L bet: 3/36 chance to win $100 
When offered a choice between the two op-
tions, most subjects choose the H bet over 
the L bet. However, when asked to state 
their lowest selling price, the majority state a 
higher price for the L bet than for the H 
bet. 
There have been three waves of studies of 
preference reversal (PR). The first included 
the original experiments of Paul Slovic and 
Sarah Lichtenstein (1968), Lichtenstein and 
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Slovic (1971, 1973), and the study of Harold 
Lindman (1971 ). The second wave of stud-
ies, conducted during the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, consisted of critical replications 
and attempts to eliminate preference rever-
sals by procedural variations and by in-
creased incentives. A particularly careful 
replication was performed by David Grether 
and Charles Plott (1979) who designed a 
series of experiments "to discredit the psy-
chologists' work as applied to economics" 
(p. 623). Grether and Plott generated a list 
of 13 objections and potential artifacts that 
would render the preference-reversal phe-
nomenon irrelevant to economic theory. 
Their list included poor motivation, income 
effects, strategic responding, and the fact 
that the experimenters were psychologists 
(which might have led the respondents to be 
suspicious and behave peculiarly). Grether 
and Plott attempted to eliminate PR by care-
ful experimental procedures, including a spe-
cial incentive system, but the effect was 
hardly diminished. Further studies by Robert 
Hamm (1984), Werner Pommerehne, 
Fredrich Schneider, and Peter Zweifel (1982), 
and Robert Reilly (1982) led to similar con-
clusions. PR was also observed by John 
Mowen and James Gentry (1980) in both 
individual and group choices concerning 
product development, by Marc Knez and 
Vernon Smith (1986) who allowed their sub-
jects to trade bets in an experimental mar-
ket, and by Joyce Berg, John Dickhaut, and 
John O'Brien (1985) who introduced arbi-
trage. See also Slovic and Lichtenstein (1983). 
The robustness of preference reversals led 
to the third wave of articles, which at-
tempted to explain the phenomenon rather 
than eliminate it. Three classes of models for 
PR were introduced: a) nontransitive choice 
models were developed independently by 
Graham Loomes and Robert Sugden (1982, 
1983), and by Peter Fishburn (1984, 1985); 
b) response bias models were proposed by 
Amos Tversky, Shmuel Sattath, and Paul 
Slovic (1988), and by William Goldstein and 
Hillel Einhorn (1987); and c) generalized 
utility models, which maintain transitivity 
but abandon the independence axiom, were 
applied to PR by Charles Holt (1986), and 
Edi Kami and Zvi Safra (1987). The three 
families of models respectively attribute PR 
to violations of transitivity, procedure invari-
ance, or the independence axiom. Violations 
of these principles have been observed in 
other contexts, but their contributions to PR 
have not been assessed. The present paper 
provides such assessment. To accomplish this 
goal, we extend the traditional experimental 
design, introduce an ordinal payoff scheme, 
and develop a new diagnostic analysis to 
determine the causes of PR. 
A. Diagnostic Analysis. Let CH and CL de-
note, respectively, the cash equivalent (or 
minimum selling price) of Hand L, and >-
and z denote strict preference and indif-
ference, respectively. (The elicitation of cash 
equivalents is discussed in the next section.) 
A standard preference reversal (PR) is said 
to occur when His preferred to L, but L is 
priced higher than H, that is, H >- L, and 
CL> CH' Note that >- refers to preference 
between options, whereas > refers to the 
ordering of cash amounts. We assume that 
the two relations are consistent in the sense 
that X > Y implies X >- Y; more money is 
preferred to less. We now show that PR 
implies either intransitivity or a failure of 
procedure invariance, or both. Procedure in-
variance holds whenever the decision maker 
prefers a bet B to a cash amount X if and 
only if his or her selling price for B exceeds 
X; that is, B >- X iff CB> X. In particular, 
invariance implies that CB= X iff B "" X. If 
invariance holds, PR entails the following 
cycle 
where the two inequalities are implied by PR 
and the two equivalences follow from invari-
ance. 
Because procedure invariance is com-
monly taken for granted, many authors have 
interpreted PR as an instance of intransitiv-
ity. The finding that strategically equivalent 
methods of elicitation yield systematical-
ly different preferences (see, for example, 
Tversky et al., 1988) suggests that PR may 
be caused by a failure of procedure invari-
ance, not of transitivity. Two types of dis-
crepancy between choice and pricing could 
produce PR: overpricing of L and under-
pricing of H. Overpricing of L is said to 
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occur if the decision maker prefers the price 
over the bet when offered a choice between 
them (i.e., CL >- L ). Underpricing of H is 
said to occur if the decision maker prefers 
the bet over its price in a direct choice (i.e., 
H >- CH). The two other forms of a choice-
pricing discrepancy-underpricing of L and 
overpricing of H-produce a nonstandard 
pattern of reversals. Note that overpricing 
and underpricing merely identify the sign of 
the discrepancy between pricing and choice; 
the labels do not imply that the bias resides 
in the pricing. 
If PR is due to an intransitivity, it should 
be observable in binary choice data without 
the use of a pricing task. On the other hand, 
choice could be transitive if PR is due to 
overpricing of L or to underpricing of H. In 
order to find out whether PR is caused by 
intransitivity or by non-invariance, we ex-
tend the usual experimental design to in-
clude an option of receiving $X for sure. In 
this design, the decision maker provides three 
choices (H-L, H-X, L-X) and two assess-
ments of price (CH and CL). The relevant 
data for diagnosing the sources of PR con-
sists of all patterns of preferences satisfying 
These are the patterns that exhibit PR and 
satisfy the condition that X lies between the 
two prices. Note that for any PR pattern it is 
possible to select a cash amount X that falls 
between the two prices stated by a given 
individual. For an experiment, however, it is 
more convenient to determine X in advance 
and to restrict the analysis to all PR patterns 
in which the prices stated by the subject 
straddle the predetermined value of X. The 
critical data, then, are the observed choices 
between X and H and between X and L. 
Ignoring ties, there are four possible re-
sponse patterns. 
(1) Intransitivity: L >- X and X >- H, 
yielding L >- X >- H >- L. 
(2) Overpricing of L ( OL ): X >- H and 
X >- L, yielding CL>- X >- L. 
(3) Underpricing of H (UH): H >- X and 
L >- X, yielding H >- X >- CH. 
( 4) Both OL and UH: H >- X and X >- L, 
yielding H >- X > CH and CL>- X >- L. 
Note that the present diagnostic proce-
dure classifies all test patterns according to 
whether they violate transitivity but not in-
variance (pattern 1) or invariance but not 
transitivity (patterns 2, 3, and 4) because no 
test pattern can violate both. The relative 
frequencies of these patterns can be used to 
test PR models that assume invariance but 
not ,transitivity (for example, the regret the-
ory of Graham Loomes and Robert Sugden, 
1982) against models that assume transitivity 
but not invariance (for example, the contin-
gent weighting model of Tversky et al., 1988). 
The relative incidence of violations of transi-
tivity and invariance could be different in a 
more elaborate diagnostic procedure (involv-
ing more than three options) which yields 
patterns of preference that can violate tran-
sitivity and invariance at once. The preced-
ing discussion is summarized as follows. 
Any pattern of preferences that satisfies 
the test conditions (H >- L and CL> X> 
CH) and monetary consistency ( X > Y im-
plies X >- Y) obeys the following proposi-
tions: 
(i) Either transitivity or invariance ( B >- X 
iff CB > X) is violated. 
(ii) Intransitivity holds iff L >- X >- H, 
yielding pattern (1). 
(iii) Overpricing of L occurs iff X >- L, 
yielding patterns (2) or (4). . 
(iv) Underpricing of H occurs iff' H >- X, 
yielding patterns (3) or ( 4). 
This analysis provides a simple method 
for the diagnosis of all preference patterns 
satisfying the test condition according to the 
implied cause of PR. The applications of this 
method to experimental data are described 
in Studies 1 and 2. 
B. Elicitation Procedures. The preceding 
analysis provides an effective method for 
diagnosing PR, assuming preferences and 
selling prices are observable. Such data are 
routinely elicited in experiments and sur-
veys, and are normally taken at face 
value-provided the results are reproducible 
and the respondents have no reason to con-
ceal or misrepresent their preferences. Nev-
ertheless, students of choice favor elicitation 
procedures that are incentive compatible. 
Gordon Becker, Morris DeGroot, and Jacob 
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Marschak (1964) devised such a scheme for 
the elicitation of cash equivalents, which has 
often been used in PR studies. In this proce-
dure, called the BDM scheme, the subject 
states a selling price for a gamble. An offer is 
then generated by some random process. The 
subject receives the offer if it exceeds the 
stated selling price, and plays the gamble if 
the stated price exceeds the offer. 
Recently, Holt (1986), and Kami and Safra 
(1987) pointed out that the justification of 
the BDM scheme and of similar procedures 
assumes the independence axiom of ex-
pected utility theory. If this axiom fails, the 
stated price of a bet is no longer equal to its 
cash equivalent, hence the presence of PR in 
some experiments can be attributed to viola-
tions of independence. In particular, Holt 
argued that the usual payoff schemes in 
which the subject plays only one bet, se-
lected at random, assume independence 
among the subject's responses. This argu-
ment, however, invokes the independence 
axiom in a sequential setup where no sys-
tematic violations of this axiom have been 
observed. Moreover, Tversky and Daniel 
Kahneman (1986) showed that the common 
violations of independence and substitution 
generally disappear when the choice is pre-
sented in a sequential form. This finding 
undermines the empirical basis of Holt's ar-
gument. Kami and Safra analyzed the actual 
lottery induced by the BDM scheme and 
showed that a generalized utility model with 
a nonlinear (probability) weighting function 
can explain the observed discrepancy be-
tween choice and stated prices in this scheme. 
According to this interpretation, PR data do 
not reflect inconsistent preferences because 
the cl).oices and the pricing do not involve 
the same bets. Consequently, PR can be 
explained by a model that satisfies transitiv-
ity and invariance, but not independence. In 
a closely related development, Uzi Segal 
(1988) suggested that PR may be produced 
by a failure of the reduction axiom, which 
reduces a two-stage lottery to the equivalent 
one-stage lottery. The preceding accounts, 
however, cannot explain the basic finding 
that the same pattern of PR obtained under 
the BDM scheme (for example, Grether and 
Plott, 1979) is equally prevalent in experi-
ments that do not use any incentive compati-
ble elicitation scheme (for example, Lichten-
stein and Slovic, 1971) and therefore do not 
invoke the independence or the reduction 
axioms. If PR is caused by a failure of these 
axioms, the frequency of reversals should 
increase when the BDM scheme is used, 
contrary to fact. 
As noted by Karni and Safra (1987), there 
may be no incentive compatible scheme for 
the elicitation of selling prices that does not 
rely on the independence axiom. To demon-
strate preference reversals, however, it is not 
necessary to elicit the actual selling prices; it 
is sufficient to establish their order. The or-
dering of selling prices can be obtained un-
der weaker · conditions, as demonstrated by 
the following incentive compatible proce-
dure, which we call the ordinal payoff 
scheme. The subject is first presented with 
each bet separately and asked to state its 
lowest selling price. The subject is then pre-
sented with pairs of bets and asked to select 
the preferred prospect in each pair. Subjects 
know that one of these pairs will be selected 
at random at the end of the session, and that 
a random device will determine whether they 
play the bet they preferred in the choice task 
or the bet they priced higher. Because the 
prices are merely used to order the bets 
within each pair, choice and pricing are 
strategically equivalent. A reversal then 
amounts to an inconsistency in which the 
subject expresses in the choice task a prefer-
ence for playing the H bet, and in the pric-
ing task a preference for playing the L bet. 
To rationalize this pattern within a general-
ized (nonindependent) utility model, it is 
necessary to assume that subjects prefer an 
even chance to play either H or L over the 
option of playing H, and over the option of 
playing L. Such a mixed strategy, however, 
could explain random reversals, but not sys-
tematic ones. The presence of systematic re-
versals in the ordinal payoff scheme, there-
fore, cannot be explained by violations of 
independence or of the reduction axiom. 
I. Study 1 (Monetary Bets) 
The participants in the studies reported in 
this article ( unless specified otherwise) were 
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TABLE 1-THE MONETARY BETS USED IN STUDY l.a 
Triple 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Set 
H (0.97,4) (0.81,2) (0.94,3) (0.89,4) (0.94,2.5) (0.92,2) 
I L (0.31, 16) (0.19, 9) (0.50,6.5) (0.11,40) (0.39,8.5) (0.50, 5) 
X (3.85) (1.50) (2.75) (3.25) (2.40) (1.85) 
H (0.97, 100) (0.81, 50) (0.94, 75) (0.89, 100) (0.94,65) (0.92,50) 
II L (0.31,400) (0.19,225) (0.50,160) (0.11, 1000) (0.39,210) (0.50,125) 
X (95) (40) (70) (80) (60) (45) 
H (0.78, 10) (0.69, 7) (0.86,3) (0.94,4) (0.92,12) (0.89, 11) 
III L (0.08, 100) (0.17,40) (0.19, 13) (0.03,150) (0.06, 175) (0.08, 135) 
X (8) (5.50) (2.75) (3.75) (10) (9) 
•The pair (P, X) denotes a bet that offers a probability P to win $X, and nothing otherwise, and (X) denotes $X 
for sure. The probabilities were expressed as multiples of 1/36. 
recruited by ads in the University of Oregon 
newspaper. The number of men and women 
was roughly the same and their median age 
was 22 years. They were run in a class set-
ting and were paid for participation. One 
hundred and ninety-eight individuals ( called 
the main group) participated in the main 
part of Study 1. 
We constructed 18 triples that consisted of 
a high probability bet (H), a low probability 
bet ( L ), and a cash amount ( X), with 
roughly the same expected value. The 18 
triples were divided into 3 sets of 6 triples 
each, displayed in Table 1. Set I included 
relatively small bets like those used in previ-
ous studies, without negative outcomes. Set 
II was obtained by multiplying all payoffs in 
Set I by a factor of 25. Set III was a mixture 
of small and large bets including a few long 
shots. The options were presented in written 
form. All probabilities were expressed as 
multiples of 1/36 (for example, 11/36 to 
win $16.00), and interpreted with reference 
to a roulette wheel with 36 numbered sec-
tors. Within each set, the respondents first 
assessed the cash equivalent for each of the 
12 bets and then chose between the options 
of each triple: H vs. L, H vs. X, L vs. X. 
The order of the options within each set was 
randomized. The order of the sets was I, II, 
III for half of the participants, and III, II, I 
for the others. As part of the general instruc-
tions, the participants were asked to imagine 
that one pair of bets would be selected at 
random and they would have a chance to 
play either the bet they had chosen or the 
bet for which they had stated a higher cash 
equivalent. 
To investigate the effect of monetary in-
centives, we ran an additional group of sub-
jects whose payoffs were contingent on their 
responses. These subjects ( N = 179) evalu-
ated only Set I. They received the same 
instructions as the main group, but were told 
that 15 percent of the participants, selected 
at random, would actually play one bet de-
termined as follows. A pair of bets would be 
selected at random and the chosen subjects 
would play the bet that they had favored 
either in the choice or in the pricing task. 
Because each subject plays at most one bet, 
this procedure defines a compound lottery in 
which the probability of winning a prize is 
considerably smaller than in the original bet. 
Exactly the same compound lottery, how-
ever, is induced by the choice and by the 
pricing. Assuming invariance, therefore, 
there is no reason for reversals in the ordinal 
payoff scheme. 
A. Results. Table 2 presents, for each 
( H, L) pair, the percentage of subjects who 
chose H over L ( H >- L ), the percentage of 
subjects who priced H above L(CH > CL), 
and the percentage of subjects who exhibited 
PR(H >- L and CL> CH). Only the subjects 
( N = 179) who had no missing data were 
included in this analysis. Because no indif-
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TABLE 2-PERCENTAGE OF PREFERENCES FOR ALL SUBJECTS IN STUDY 1 
Triple 1 2 
Set 
H>- L 83 68 
I C11 > CL 26 22 
PR 59 53 
H>-L 91 86 
II C11 > CL 54 48 
PR 38 44 
H>- L 81 68 
III C11 > CL 38 21 
PR 48 48 
H >- L 67 75 
Is C11 > CL 44 18 
PR 32 60 
ference was allowed in choice, we excluded 
tied prices from the analysis. Their inclusion, 
of course, would have inflated the PR rate. 
The 1$ data refer to the subjects who evalu-
ated Set I with monetary incentives. 
The PR phenomenon is clearly evident in 
Table 2. Overall, His chosen over L in 74 
percent of the cases, but CH exceeds CL in 
only 34 percent of the cases. Nearly half of 
the response patterns are inconsistent and 
the standard reversals (45 percent) are over-
whelmingly more frequent than the nonstan-
dard ones (4 percent). Table 2 also shows 
that there are no major differences among 
three sets of gambles that span a wide range 
of payoffs. Furthermore, the use of monetary 
incentives in the 1$ condition had no system-
atic effect on the prevalence of PR, in agree-
ment with previous studies (see, for example, 
Slavic and Lichtenstein, 1983). The overall 
percentage of PR with real payoffs is 46 
percent (Set 1$) compared to an overall rate 
of 44 percent without payoffs (Sets I, II, III). 
The hypothesis that subjects prefer mix-
tures was tested by presenting 42 Stanford 
students with the six pairs of H and L bets 
from Set I. They were told that one-third of 
the participants, selected at random, would 
play one of their chosen bets. For each pair, 
they were given three options: (i) select the 
H bet, (ii) select the L bet, and (iii) let the 
experimenter select between H and L at 
3 4 5 6 Mean 
71 71 73 62 71 
30 33 17 14 24 
45 41 59 49 51 
77 84 82 70 82 
46 47 48 32 46 
36 41 40 44 41 
74 74 81 79 76 
39 38 58 46 40 
42 39 29 36 40 
62 67 62 56 65 
22 44 12 9 25 
51 36 50 49 46 
random. None of the responses favored the 
mixed strategy. 
The results of Study 1 cannot be explained 
as a failure of the independence axiom, or of 
the reduction axiom, for two reasons. First, 
this account assumes that the subjects favor 
a mixed strategy, contrary to the responses 
of the Stanford students. Second, even 
if-contrary to these data-we assume that 
subjects adopt a mixed strategy, the stan-
dard and the nonstandard reversals should 
have been equally frequent. We conclude 
that PR is not an elicitation artifact caused 
by nonindependence; hence it must violate 
either transitivity or procedure invariance. 
Having established the validity of PR, we 
turn now to the diagnostic analysis described 
earlier. Unlike the preceding discussion that 
was based only on the price ordering, the 
following analysis assumes that the stated 
prices CH and CL are the actual cash equiva-
lents of H and L. We shall address this 
assumption in the next section. The diagnos-
tic analysis is based on the data of all sub-
jects from the main group who completed all 
tasks. About half of the PR patterns in Sets 
I, II, and III met the test condition CL> X 
> CH, yielding 620 individual patterns of 
preference that satisfied 
This content downloaded from 128.223.84.131 on Tue, 17 Jan 2017 19:44:00 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
210 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MARCH 1990 
TABLE 3-DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSE PATTERNS IN STUDY 1 
Pattern N 
(1) L >-- X, X>-- H 62 
(2) X>-- L, X>-- H 406 
(3) L >-- X, H >-- X 38 
(4)H>--X,X>--L 114 
Total 620 
These data were classified into four types 
according to the observed relation of X to L 
and to H, and the distribution of the four 
types is presented in Table 3. The data show 
that only 10 percent of the preference pat-
terns are intransitive and 90 percent exhibit 
non-invariance. Among the non-invariant 
patterns, the overpricing of L is much more 
common than the underpricing of H. Fur-
ther evidence for this conclusion comes from 
a study by Raphael Bostic, Richard Herrn-
stein, and Duncan Luce (1990) who used a 
series of successive choices to determine, for 
each subject, a cash amount X that is indif-
ferent to a given bet. They found that this 
cash amount was roughly the same as the 
stated price for H bets and substantially 
below it for L bets. That is, X = CH and 
X < Cv as entailed by the overpricing of L. 
B. Discussion. The high incidence of prefer-
ence reversal (45 percent) obtained using the 
ordinal payoff scheme indicates that PR can-
not be explained by a generalized utility 
model, as proposed by Holt (1986), by Kami 
and Safra (1987), and by Segal (1988). Recall 
that these authors provided no direct evi-
dence for this proposal; they only showed 
that PR could be consistent with transitivity 
and invariance if independence ( or the re-
duction axiom) is discarded. The data refute 
this interpretation. The present analysis 
demonstrates that abandoning independence 
or the reduction axiom is neither necessary 
nor sufficient to account for PR. The results 
summarized in Table 3 show that the PR 
observed in Study 1 are produced primarily 
by the failure of procedure invariance. The 
finding that 90 percent of test patterns vio-
lated this condition rules out all models of 
PR that assume procedure invariance, in-
cluding regret theory (Loomes and Sugden, 
Percent Diagnosis 
10.0 In transitivity 
65.5 Overpricing of L (OL) 
6.1 Underpricing of H (UH) 
18.4 Both OL and UH 
100 
1982, 1983). Because this theory attributes 
all PR to intransitivity, it entails that 100 
percent of the test patterns in Table 3 should 
be intransitive. The fact that only 10 percent 
of the test patterns conformed to this predic-
tion indicates that regret theory does not 
provide an adequate explanation of PR. 
This conclusion does not imply that in-
transitivity plays no role in PR. Loomes, 
Chris Starmer, and Sugden (1989) have 
demonstrated that the cycle H >- L >- X >- H, 
implied by regret theory, is significantly more 
frequent than the opposite cycle L >- H >-
X >- L. The present study confirmed this re-
sult; the observed frequencies of the two 
cycles were 132 and 44, respectively (see 
Appendix 1). It is noteworthy that the inci-
dence of intransitivity reported by these in-
vestigators (15-20 percent) is higher than 
that observed in the present study, but the 
rates of PR are roughly the same. Although 
the difference in the incidence of intransitiv-
ity does not affect our main conclusion re-
garding the prevalence of non-invariance, it 
raises the question as to whether the present 
methodology underestimates the contribu-
tion of intransitivity of PR. Because the or-
dinal payoff scheme requires, in effect, the 
ranking of all bets, it might induce intransi-
tive subjects to behave transitively. But if 
our procedure reduces the number of cycles, 
it should also reduce the incidence of PR. In 
fact, the PR rate in the present study is 
slightly higher than in other studies. More-
over, the finding that the rate of PR is gener-
ally insensitive to the payoff scheme makes 
this possibility even less likely. Finally, Ap-
pendix 1 shows that the percentage of cycles 
that satisfy the test condition (10 percent) is 
higher than the percentage of cycles among 
PR patterns that do not satisfy the test con-
dition (5.2 percent). The available evidence, 
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therefore, does not support the hypothesis 
that the present diagnostic procedure under-
estimates intransitivity, although this possi-
bility cannot be ruled out. 
It could be argued that the subjects in 
Study 1 did not state their actual selling 
prices but rather some monotone transfor-
mation of these prices because only their 
order-not the actual values-is relevant to 
the present payoff scheme. The subjects, 
however, had no strategic or any other rea-
son to transform their prices. Moreover, the 
present procedure discourages such transfor-
mation because the subject has to evaluate 
each bet separately, without knowing how it 
will be paired. Stating the cash equivalent of 
each bet, as requested, is obviously the sim-
plest way to achieve a ranking without hav-
ing to remember the responses to previous 
bets. Indeed, the standard deviations (across 
subjects) of observed prices in Study 1 did 
not exceed those obtained from comparable 
bets in studies that used the BDM scheme 
(for example, Bostic, Herrnstein, and Luce, 
1990), contrary to what might be expected if 
our subjects reported monotone transforma-
tions of their selling prices. As in other stud-
ies, the standard deviations were consider-
ably smaller for H bets than for L bets. 
In contrast to the present design where 
each bet was priced separately and the sub-
ject did not know which bets would be 
paired, James Cox and Seth Epstein (1989) 
employed a different procedure in which the 
subject priced each pair of H and L bets 
concurrently, and then played the higher-
priced bet. This procedure allows the subject 
to generate a price ordering by comparing 
the two bets without performing the more 
difficult task of assessing their actual selling 
prices. Indeed, Cox and Epstein acknowl-
edged ( on the basis of the subjects' re-
sponses) that their procedure did not elicit 
proper cash equivalents. Because the bets 
were framed differently in choice and in 
pricing (by translating all outcomes), many 
response patterns were inconsistent (32 per-
cent), but the reversals were random rather 
than systematic. 
C. Scale Compatibility. Why do people 
overprice the low-probability high-payoff 
bets? Following Tversky et al. (1988), we 
interpret this finding as an instance of a 
more general principle of compatibility: the 
weight of any aspect (for example, probabil-
ity, payoff) of an object of evaluation is 
enhanced by compatibility with the response 
(for example, choice, pricing). The effect of 
scale compatibility is illustrated in a study 
by Slavic, Dale Griffin, and Tversky (1990). 
Participants predicted the 1987 market value 
of twelve companies (taken from Business 
Week top 100) on the basis of their 1986 
market value (in billions of dollars), and 
their rank (among the top 100) with respect 
to 1987 profits. One-half of the subjects pre-
dicted 1987 market value in billions of dol-
lars, whereas the other half predicted the 
company's rank with respect to its 1987 mar-
ket value. As implied by compatibility, each 
predictor was given more weight when the 
criterion was expressed on the same scale 
(for example, money, rank). As a conse-
quence, the relative weight of the 1986 mar-
ket value was twice as high for those who 
predicted in dollars than for those who pre-
dicted the corresponding rank. This effect 
produced many reversals of judgment in 
which one company was ranked above an-
other but the order of their predicted value 
was reversed. 
Because the selling price of a bet is ex-
pressed in dollars, compatibility entails that 
the payoffs, which are expressed in the same 
units, will be weighted more heavily in pric-
ing than in choice. (Since the payoffs are 
much larger in the L bets than in the H 
bets, the major consequence of a compatibil-
ity bias is overpricing of L bets.) To accom-
modate violations of procedure invariance, 
Tversky et al. (1988) developed a family of 
models in which the weighting of attributes 
is contingent on the method of elicitation. 
The simplest model of this type, called the 
contingent weighting model, assumes that 
the bet B = ( P, X) is chosen over B' = 
(P', X') iff 
log P + a log X > log P' + a log X'. 
and that B is priced above B' iff 
log P + /3 log X > log P' + /3 log X'. 
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This loglinear form represents the ordering 
of bets according to both choice and pricing 
by a multiplicative probability-value model 
with a power function for gains. In this 
representation, procedure invariance entails 
/3 = a, whereas compatibility implies /3 > a. 
Slavic et al. (1990) applied this model to the 
choice and the price ordering from Study 1 
and assessed a and /3 separately for each 
subject. In accord with compatibility, /3 
exceeded a for 87 percent of the subjects 
( N = 179) indicating greater risk aversion in 
choice than in pricing. 
The role of compatibility in PR was inves-
tigated in two additional studies reported by 
Slavic et al. (1990). In the first study, sub-
jects were presented with six pairs of H and 
L bets. Three pairs involved monetary pay-
offs as in Study 1, and three pairs involved 
nonmonetary outcomes, such as a one-week 
pass for all movie theaters in town, or a 
dinner for two at a good restaurant. If pref-
erence reversals are due primarily to the 
compatibility of prices and payoffs, which 
are both expressed in dollars, their incidence 
should be substantially reduced by the use of 
nonmonetary outcomes. This prediction was 
confirmed: the percentage of choice of H 
over L was roughly the same in the mone-
tary (63 percent) and the nonmonetary bets 
(66 percent), but the percentage of cases in 
which CL> CH was substantially greater in 
the former (54 percent) than in the latter (33 
percent), and the overall incidence of PR 
decreased significantly from 41 percent to 24 
percent. 
A second study by Slavic et al. (1990) 
investigated reversals in a matching task. 
This experiment employed the 12 pairs of H 
and L bets from Sets I and II, described in 
Table 1. In each pair, one value-either a 
probability or a payoff-was missing, and 
the subjects were asked to set the missing 
value so that they would be indifferent be-
tween the two bets. Consider, for example, 
the bets H = (0.92, $50) and L = (0.50, $125) 
from Set II, Table 1. If we replace the 0.5 
probability in L by a question mark, the 
subject is asked in effect "what chance to 
win $125 is equally attractive as a 0.92 chance 
to win $50?," The value set by the subject 
implies a preference between the original 
bets. If the value exceeds 0.50, we infer that 
the subject prefers H to L, and if the value 
is less than 0.50, we reach the opposite con-
clusion. Using all four components as miss-
ing values, the authors obtained the prefer-
ences inferred from matching either the 
probability or the payoff of each bet. Be-
cause compatibility applies to matching, not 
only to pricing, the attribute on which that 
match is made is expected to be weighted 
more heavily than the other attribute. As a 
consequence, the inferred percentage of pref-
erence for H over L should be higher for 
probability matches than for payoff matches. 
Indeed, the overall percentage of preference 
for H over L derived from probability 
matches (73 percent) was significantly higher 
than that derived from payoff matches (49 
percent). 
The matching data suggest an additional 
factor, besides scale compatibility, that might 
contribute to PR. In an extensive compari-
son of choice and matching, Tversky et al. 
(1988) have shown that the more prominent 
attribute of options looms larger in choice 
than in matching. Thus, the choice order is 
more lexicographic than that induced by 
matching. If probability is perceived by sub-
jects as more important than payoffs, as 
suggested by the finding that the rating of 
bets is dominated by probability (Goldstein 
and Einhorn, 1987; Slavic and Lichtenstein, 
1968), then the prominence effect may con-
tribute to PR over and above the effect of 
scale compatibility. This could help explain 
the robustness of PR, as well as the similar-
ity between the choice data and the prefer-
ences derived from probability matches. Note 
that in pricing and payoff matches, both 
compatibility and prominence enhance the 
PR effect, whereas in probability matches, 
they operate in opposite directions (see, 
Slavic et al., 1990). 
II. Study 2 (Time Preferences) 
According to compatibility, reversals of 
preference are not restricted to risky 
prospects; they should also occur in other 
situations in which decision makers both 
choose and price options with a monetary 
component. In the next study, we test this 
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TABLE 4-THE OPTIONS USED IN STUDY 2 AND THE RESPECTIVE PERCENTAGE 
OF PREFERENCES. THE PAIR (X, T) DENOTES THE OPTION OF RECEIVING 
$X, TYEARS FROM NOW, AND (X) DENOTES AN IMMEDIATE CASH PAYMENT 
Triple 1 2 
s (1600,1.5) (1600, 1.5) 
L (2500,5) (3550, 10) 
X (1250) (1250) 
S>-L 57 72 
Cs>CL 12 19 
PR 49 56 
prediction in the context of time preferences. 
Consider a delayed payment of the form 
( X, T) that offers a payment of $X, T years 
from now. Following the design of Study 1, 
we constructed four triples of options that 
consisted of a long-term prospect L (for 
example, $2500, 5 years from now), a short-
term prospect S (for example, $1600, 1.5 
years from now), and an immediate payment 
X (for example, $1250 now). 
One hundred and sixty-nine subjects par-
ticipated in the study. One-half of the sub-
jects first chose between the three pairs of 
options (S vs. L, S vs. X, L vs. X) in each 
triple. The order of the pairs was random-
ized across triples. Following the choice, 
these subjects priced each of the S and L 
options by stating "the smallest immediate 
cash payment for which they would be will-
ing to exchange the delayed payment." The 
other subjects performed the choice and 
pricing tasks in the opposite order. There 
were no systematic differences between the 
groups, so their data were combined. 
The upper part of Table 4 presents the 
four triples of options employed in this study. 
The lower part of the table includes, for each 
triples, the percentage of subjects who chose 
S over L ( S >- L ), the percentage of subjects 
who priced S above L (Cs> CL), and the 
percentage of PR patterns (S >- L and CL> 
Cs). Table 4 reveals a massive amount of 
PR. Overall, the short-term option (S) was 
chosen over the long-term option (L) 74 
percent of the time, but was priced higher 
only 25 percent of the time, yielding more 
than 50 percent PR patterns. 
Note that in the pricing task each option 
is evaluated singly whereas choice involves a 
3 4 Mean 
(2500,5) (1525,0.5) 
(3550,10) (1900,2.5) 
(1250) (1350) 
83 83 74 
29 40 25 
57 46 52 
comparison between options. The observed 
reversals, therefore, are consistent with an 
alternative hypothesis that payoffs are 
weighted more heavily in a singular than in a 
comparative evaluation. To test this hypoth-
esis, we replicated the study in a new group 
of 184 subjects, with one change. Instead of 
pricing the options, the subjects were asked 
to rate the attractiveness of each option on a 
scale from O (not at all attractive) to 20 
(extremely attractive). If PR is controlled, in 
part at least, by the nature of the task (singu-
lar vs. comparative), rating and pricing 
should yield similar results. On the other 
hand, if PR is produced primarily by the 
compatibility between payoffs and prices, 
rating and choice should yield similar re-
sults. The data reveal no discrepancy be-
tween choice and rating. Overall, S was cho-
sen over L 75 percent of the time (as in the 
original study) and the rating of S exceeded 
the rating of L in 76 percent of the cases, in 
accord with procedure invariance. Only 11 
percent of the patterns exhibited PR. 
We also applied the diagnostic analysis to 
the results of Study 2. Recall that the rele-
vant test data consisted of all patterns of the 
form 
S >-Land CL> X> Cs. 
These are the patterns that exhibit prefer-
ence reversal, and the immediate payment of 
$X falls between the two cash equivalents. 
These data were classified into four types 
according to the observed relation of X to L 
and to S. The distribution of the four types 
is presented in Table 5 along with the appro-
priate diagnoses. The table shows that the 
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TABLE 5-DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSE PATTERNS IN STUDY 2. 
Pattern N 
(1) L >- X, X >- S 16 
(2) X >- L, X >- S 57 
(3) L >- X, S >- X 12 
(4) S >- X, X >- L 19 
Total 104 
major determinant of PR in delayed pay-
ments is the overpricing of the long-term 
prospect ( L ), and that the underpricing of 
the short-term prospect (S) and the intransi-
tivity of >- play a relatively minor role (see 
also Appendix 2). Evidently, payoffs are 
weighted more heavily in pricing than in 
choice. 
III. General Discussion 
The preference-reversal phenomenon has 
been demonstrated in numerous studies but 
its causes have not been established. The 
present article attempts to determine these 
causes by comparing several accounts that 
attribute PR to violations of transitivity, 
procedure invariance, independence, or the 
reduction axiom. To assess the relative con-
tributions of these effects we extend the 
standard experimental design, employ an or-
dinal payoff scheme, and introduce a new 
diagnostic analysis. The results appear quite 
clear. 
First, PR cannot be attributed to viola-
tions of the independence or the reduction 
axioms and therefore cannot be rationalized 
by a generalized (nonindependent) utility 
model, as proposed by Holt (1986), Kami 
and Safra (1987), and Segal (1988). Note 
that the basic PR pattern does not involve 
these axioms, which are only needed to jus-
tify payoff procedures such as the BDM 
scheme. If PR were caused by nonindepen-
dence, or by a failure of the reduction ax-
iom, it should be observed in the BDM 
scheme but not in the present ordinal scheme 
or in experiments where the payoffs are not 
contingent on the subject's responses. The 
finding that PR is no more frequent in the 
BDM scheme, which assumes independence, 
than in elicitation procedures that do not 
Percent Diagnosis 
15.4 In transitivity 
54.8 Overpricing of L (OL) 
11.5 Underpricing of S (US) 
18.3 Both OL and US 
100 
assume this axiom, rules out nonindepen-
dence as a viable explanation of PR. Evi-
dently, the effect of response mode (for ex-
ample, choice, pricing) cannot be explained 
by the payoff scheme. 
If PR does not represent a violation of 
independence or of the reduction axiom, it 
must be due either to intransitivity or to a 
failure of procedure invariance. The diagnos-
tic procedure indicates that only 10 percent 
of PR patterns are intransitive while the 
remaining 90 percent represent non-invari-
ance. Because Fishburn's (1984, 1985) SSB 
model and Loomes and Sugden's (1982, 
1983) regret theory assume procedure invari-
ance and attribute all PR to intransitivity, 
they do not provide an adequate account of 
preference reversals. It is also noteworthy 
that regret theory is consistent with the pre-
dominant direction of the (relatively small 
percentage of) intransitive triples observed 
in Study 1, but is not consistent with the 
pronounced intransitivity of choices between 
gambles demonstrated by Tversky (1969). 
The overpricing of the low-probability 
high-payoffs bets emerges from the present 
analysis as the major cause of PR. The re-
sults of Raphael Bostic, Richard Herrnstein, 
and Duncan Luce (1990) provide further 
support for this conclusion. We have inter-
preted the overpricing of long shots as an 
effect of scale compatibility: because the 
prices and the payoffs are expressed in the 
same units, payoffs are weighted more heav-
ily in pricing than in choice. Compatibility 
also implies new preference reversals in other 
domains, such as time preferences. Study 2 
shows that when faced with a choice be-
tween delayed payments, people frequently 
select the short-term prospect but assign a 
higher cash equivalent to the long-term 
prospect. Other consequences of compatibil-
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ity have been confirmed in other studies 
showing (i) that the prevalence of PR is 
substantially reduced by using nonmonetary 
payoffs, and (ii) that the matched attribute is 
weighted more heavily than the other at-
tribute in a matching task. Further evidence 
on the role of compatibility in PR, based on 
attention and anchoring data, is presented 
by David Schkade and Eric Johnson (1989). 
We conclude that scale compatibility ex-
plains, at least in part, the primary cause of 
PR, namely the overpricing of L bets. It 
should be noted, however, that compatibility 
does not explain several secondary effects 
commonly observed in PR studies, including 
the occurrence of systematic intransitivities 
and the occasional underpricing of H bets. 
Experimental studies of choice challenge 
the classical analysis of decision making. Vi-
olations of the independence axiom of ex-
pected utility theory have attracted much 
attention. In addition, a growing body of 
empirical evidence questions the assumption 
of invariance, which is essential to the theory 
of rational choice. In particular, alternative 
framings of the same options (for example, 
in terms of gains vs. losses, or in terms of 
survival vs. mortality) produce inconsistent 
preferences (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986), 
and alternative elicitation procedures (for 
example, choice, pricing) give rise to reversal 
of preferences (Tversky, et al. 1988). These 
results confirm the conclusion of Grether 
and Plott: 
Taken at face value the data are simply 
inconsistent with preference theory and 
have broad implications about research 
priorities within economics. The incon-
sistency is deeper than the mere lack of 
transitivity or even stochastic transitiv-
ity. It suggests that no optimization 
principles of any sort lie behind the 
simplest of human choices and that the 
uniformities in human choice behavior 
which lie behind market behavior may 
result from principles which are of a 
completely different sort from those 
generally accepted. 
[1979, p. 623] 
Indeed, the failures of description invari-
ance (framing effects) and procedure invar-
iance ( elicitation effects) pose a greater 
problem for rational choice models than the 
failure of specific axioms, such as indepen-
dence or transitivity, and they demand de-
scriptive models of much greater complexity. 
Violations of description invariance require 
an explicit treatment of the framing process, 
which precedes the evaluation of prospects 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Violations 
of procedure invariance require context-
dependent models (for example, Tversky et 
al., 1988) in which the weighting of at-
tributes is contingent on the method of elici-
tation. These developments highlight the 
discrepancy between the normative and the 
descriptive approaches to decision making, 
which many choice theorists (see Mark 
Machina, 1987) have tried to reconcile. Be-
cause invariance-unlike independence or 
even transitivity-is normatively unassail-
able and descriptively incorrect, it does not 
seem possible to construct a theory of choice 
that is both normatively acceptable and de-
scriptively adequate. 
APPENDIX I-DISTRIBUTION OF 
RESPONSE 
PATTERNS IN STUDY 1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. X >- H, H >- L, X >- L 406 142 154 2 203 427 1334 
2. H >- X, L >- H, L >- X 81 8 61 0 13 25 188 
3. X >- H, H >- L, L >- X 62 8 15 0 25 22 132 
4. H >- X, L >- H, X >- L 20 4 7 0 2 11 44 
5. X >- H, L >- H, X >- L 81 10 17 1 32 26 167 
6. H >- X, H >- L, L >- X 38 11 33 0 13 11 106 
7. X >- H, L >- H, L >- X 158 15 54 1 52 19 299 
8. H >- X, H >- L, X >- L 114 114 89 2 22 128 469 
Total 960 312 430 6 362 669 2739 
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APPENDIX 2-DISTRIBUTION OF 
RESPONSE 
PATTERNS IN STUDY 2 
1. X >- S, S >- L, X >- L 
2. S >- X, L >- S, L >- X 
3. X >- S, S >- L, L >- X 
4. S >- X, L >- S, X >- L 
5. X >- S, L >- S, X >- L 
6. S >- X, S >- L, L >- X 
7. X >- S, L >- S, L >- X 
8. S >- X, S >- L, X >- L 
Total 
1 
57 
19 
16 
1 
14 
12 
9 
19 
147 
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